Grammar as metaphor

I’ve been noticing more uses of grammatical metalanguage in non-technical senses, either because people thought they were using it in the technical sense but were wrong, or because they’re using terms with a metaphorical, expanded meaning. Here, I just mean to catalog 2 of them. I don’t mean to point my pallid, vitamin-D-starved linguist finger at normies and make fun of how little they understand their own words, but just to point out that with linguistics going a tiny bit mainstream (I hope?), some of its technical jargon has been adapted, with modifications, for general use. If this trend continues, maybe linguists will begin to understand the frustration of psychologists and neuroscientists trying to explain what remember means.

Passive Voice Confuses, and People Are Confused

The term “passive voice” has been recruited as a metaphor for a few different features of discourse, almost always ones that the writer/speaker does not like. It always seems to refer to some attempt to obscure responsibility for an act, whether or not the utterance being called out includes what grammarians would call “passive voice”. Here are some examples of the various ways that people use “passive voice” in senses that range from technically correct to clearly not.

Here we see it used in a way consistent with its technical definition to criticize hiding the agent:

While this is technically correct, it is still interesting to see a grammar term used on Twitter as a form of criticism. If it were up to me, people would criticize each other much more for using the present simple. And incidentally, I don’t find anything problematic about this instance of passive voice – the patients are the focus of the article, and no reasonable reader would misinterpret the situation.

Here we see it used to describe an active, but unaccusative verb. It is noteworthy that people don’t attack newspaper headlines on Twitter for using unaccusative verbs – “passive voice” has made the leap to popular consciousness while more esoteric terms have not.

I assume if you’re reading this that you know what passive voice is, but you might not know the slightly less common term unaccusative (I often confuse it with unergative myself). Unaccusative verbs are intransitive verbs (verbs that don’t take an object) that lack an agent; their subjects undergo some process like fall, end, or break with no implication that the subject intended it. Perhaps contributing to the confusion around passive voice is that some verbs like break can also be transitive and used in the passive voice.

The vase was broken. (transitive and in passive voice, hiding the agent)

The vase broke. (intransitive and in active voice, without an agent)

Apparently, and in one of the linguistic fun facts I learned from Steven Pinker before my MA, causative alternation (“I broke the chair” : “The chair broke” :: *”I fell the vase” : “The vase fell”) is one of many rules with many odd exceptions that adult speakers take for granted but that learners and children take quite some time to get down.

Here we see a version of “passive” which extends the “supine, acquiescent” meaning from outside of linguistics of the word into a quasi-grammatical term:

On Twitter, I made an early attempt to capture what people mean when they use “passive” in this way:

But clearly, people mean “passive voice” as a criticism of utterances or discourse that are insufficient in clarity or strength of blame, not merely grammatical agency. You can see this below, in which the writer (correctly) identifies the passive voice, but as a remedy, also changes the verb from injured to the more impactful shot.

Being a Verb is a Gerund

The extended meaning of “verb” is a bit easier to define than that of “passive voice”. In examples like those below, people define “verb” as any deliberate action. Obviously, in grammatical metalanguage, actions can be expressed with any part of speech, and confusingly, the words “action” and “verb” are both nouns (except in the case of verbing), meaning that when we say “a verb is an action word”, the only verb in the sentence we just used to define verbs as action words is the non-action verb “is”.

Clearly, the technical meaning of “verb” includes a lot of things that aren’t actions (like “include”), but in the popular parlance, a “verb” is an action taken with effort and thought.

In the example below, the writer means to emphasize that being an anti-racist educator requires active effort.

There is a discussion separate from whether “be” is a verb (as of this writing, it is) that is focused on whether “be” is always stative, like “seem” or “think” (as in “I think so”), or can be a dynamic verb like “swim” or “regurgitate”. Obviously, in senses like “to be an anti-racist educator”, most people would call “be” stative, undercutting the intended implication of the utterance since stative verbs do not denote any kind of deliberate action. On the other hand, I remember a Louis CK bit (no link, but you are free to look it up) where he describes his boredom of watching his kids “be children”, which sounds to me like a dynamic verb meant to capture the various actions that being a child entails. Note that in this case, “be” also seems not to take its normal conjugations – he said “they be children”, not “they are children”. I wish I had another, less scandalous, example.

The writer below also seems to think “word” itself has a negative connotation, and that a “word” is a more sterile (and maybe “passive”) thing than a “verb”.

Here, “noun” is counterposed with “verb”, probably for its supposed inactive qualities. Of course, anyone with basic knowledge of grammar can see that “love” is only used as a noun in this tweet.

In the cases of both passive voice and verbs, some stereotyped characteristic of the grammatical feature seems to be the source of the extended meaning – dishonest framing in the case of passive voice, and deliberate action in the case of verbs.

Let’s speculate on what could be next idea from linguistics to make it to the mainstream. I have long hoped for the idea of “markedness”, something being slightly off from the norm (usually with intent, unless the subject doesn’t know the code by which his/her behavior is being judged) without being technically wrong, to make it into people’s explanations of, for example, culture shock, driving habits, or joke writing. Another is the phenomenon by which indirect references are reinterpreted as direct references by cutting out the middleman, aka the dead metaphor, which explains how the suffix “-gate” can be an indirect reference to scandals in general to the generation that saw Nixon’s scandals firsthand to just the name for any scandal to subsequent generations.

I definitely hope for more recognition for the linguistics/philosophy version of “performative” (as in “comes to be through its performance”) instead of the currently en vogue definition, “putting on a show for the benefit of audience perceptions”. I imagine when people hear some version of “gender is performative” alongside “… politician’s apology was performative” and “performative activism”, they might get the wrong idea about how trans people see their gender.

Then again, the next linguistics term to make it big might be totally out of left field: Maybe “argument structure” will come to mean “speech format”? Or “wug test” for comparison shopping for floor decorations? “U-shaped development” for a diet program?

Counterproductive SEVP rules for ESL

At the moment, universities across the US are panicking about a rule change from ICE saying that:

Students attending schools operating entirely online may not take a full online course load and remain in the United States. The U.S. Department of State will not issue visas to students enrolled in schools and/or programs that are fully online for the fall semester nor will U.S. Customs and Border Protection permit these students to enter the United States.

https://www.ice.gov/doclib/sevis/pdf/bcm2007-01.pdf

Obviously, this is a mean-spirited and counterproductive policy, regardless of what one thinks the purpose of higher ed is (unless you think the purpose is mean-spiritedness).

I want to draw attention to a particular change in policy, or rather discontinuation of exemption to previous policy, that is also counterproductive in a way that is very nuts-and-bolts to ESL teachers.

3) Students attending schools adopting a hybrid model—that is, a mixture of online and in person classes—will be allowed to take more than one class or three credit hours online. These schools must certify to SEVP, through the Form I-20, “Certificate of Eligibility for Nonimmigrant Student Status,” that the program is not entirely online, that the student is not taking an entirely online course load for the fall 2020 semester, and that the student is taking the minimum number of online classes required to make normal progress in their degree program. The above exemptions do not apply to F-1 students in English language training programs or M-1 students, who are not permitted to enroll in any online courses (emphasis added)

Ibid

Which refers to this section of the rules set out by USCIS’s Student Exchange and Visitors Program (SEVP):

(G) For F-1 students enrolled in classes for credit or classroom hours, no more than the equivalent of one class or three credits per session, term, semester, trimester, or quarter may be counted toward the full course of study requirement if the class is taken on-line or through distance education and does not require the student’s physical attendance for classes, examination or other purposes integral to completion of the class. An on-line or distance education course is a course that is offered principally through the use of television, audio, or computer transmission including open broadcast, closed circuit, cable, microwave, or satellite, audio conferencing, or computer conferencing. If the F-1 student’s course of study is in a language study program, no on-line or distance education classes may be considered to count toward a student’s full course of study requirement (emphasis added).

https://www.ice.gov/sevis/schools/reg

This was an unnecessary rule before COVID-19, but is severely counterproductive now. To understand why, it’s important to look at institutions’ guidelines for face-to-face classes in the fall and consider them in light of common practice in ESL classrooms.

Although my university and many others are “reopening” on-campus instruction in the fall, the reality of the classroom will be quite a bit different from pre-COVID times. Citing my own university’s guidelines for the coming fall semester:

Faculty, staff and students are expected to wear face coverings as required by the Governor’s Executive Order. SUU will provide masks for those who do not have their own.

To help with contract tracing efforts this fall, professors will keep seating charts and take attendance in classrooms.

https://www.suu.edu/coronavirus/classroom-instruction.html, emphasis added

In addition to these mandated countermeasures of masks and assigned seating, any professors with common sense will seat students at least 6 feet from each other if space allows, and will definitely keep at least 6 feet away from the students themselves. By themselves, these measures (required and commonsense) are welcome, but combined with the requirement that language classes be held in person, they create the potential for a very unproductive fall 2020 semester for ESL programs.

Main Image
Source: https://www.wsetglobal.com/knowledge-centre/blog/2020/june/17/return-to-the-classroom-post-covid-19 – “The Wine & Spirit Education Trust provides globally recognised education and qualifications in wines, spirits and sake, for professionals and enthusiasts.” Yet another subfield of education that I didn’t know existed

Consider how hard this makes many, if not most, of the staple activities of the ESL classroom – basically anything other than lectures, which ESL teachers tend to avoid (as do many pedagogically modern teachers in other fields). I was going to make a list of popular activities that are made difficult or impossible under social distancing rules, but there’d be no point – all of them are. Just imagine trying to do any kind of group work with students covering their faces, seated 6 feet apart, and unable to change seats. In the ESL classroom, for many good pedagogical reasons, “group work” is of course not a side order or a topping over the nutritious main course of lectures, but often the main course itself, including as it does:

  • Reading circles
  • Discussion circles
  • Any other type of discussion
  • Peer feedback (at least other than as comments on Google Docs)
  • Group presentations
  • Group projects
  • Information gap activities
  • Minimal pair activities
  • A million things I’m forgetting at the moment

In addition to the above, I can’t imagine a classroom where I stay stuck at the front, unable to interact with my students on a person-to-person basis during class time. It’s quite hard to judge whether students really get the difference between D-identity and A-identity when I can’t listen in on their discussions or pull them aside and ask them a question or two.

I’m not sure, but I suspect that part of the justification for USCIS’s face-to-face rule for language classes is exactly that real-time practice is so important to language acquisition. In that sense, the rule may have been justified as a way to ensure private ESLs were giving pedagogically sound education to students on F-1 visas. If that is true, then what is the point of requiring face-to-face instruction when most face-to-face activities will be impossible to carry out?

The point of this post is not to decry my university’s social distancing guidelines or even its reopening, but to point out that the combination of reopening, social distancing, and the SEVP rule stating that language classes must be face-to-face mean that ESL teachers and their students are stuck in a worst-of-both-worlds situation. If asked, I’m sure most of us would say that face-to-face classes are preferable to strictly online ones, but that is because under normal circumstances we make good use of the synchronous and immediate classroom milieu. When we can’t be physically in the same classroom at the same time, we can still use many of the same or similar activities synchronously or asynchronously over the Internet, often with similar or even better outcomes. We’ve now had half of spring semester and all of the summer to figure out how to adapt our classes to online delivery, and at least in my experience, it now seems that many classroom activities actually work better online (modeling pronunciation for one – I can’t show them nearly as much of the inside of my mouth in person), and I would continue to “outsource” some of my class time to Zoom, Flipgrid, and Google Drive given the choice. It seems that some combination of remote and in-person classes (in other words, hybrid classes) would be ideal. Forcing us back into 18 hours of face-to-face instruction per week with only lectures as an instructional tool exposes us (students and faculty) to risks with not only no reward, but a severe penalty in instructional quality.

Identity Creep

We are all familiar now with the idea that people can be sized up and determined to be inherently suspicious, to be inherently criminal, and (somehow) to have inherently have just committed a crime based on appearance. A theoretical lens on identity can help shed light on this process, and is one of the most common discoveries my students make when looking at narratives through that lens.

Identity

Psychologist James Paul Gee’s conception of identity is useful and instructive for its overall thesis – that identities are not so much what is true, but instead are what is recognizable and recognized – and for its helpful breakdown into four categories: N (nature), I (institution), D (discourse), and A (affinity). Let me give a few choice quotes that explain each before moving on to the topic that the title of this post refers to, that tendency of one identity, thought to be biologically determined, to usurp the roles of the others, changing characteristics that should originate in other facets of social life into innate, “natural” traits of one’s race or gender.

First, all of Gee’s conception of identity is distinct from the commonsense view of identity, that it is something deep inside of us that we know to be true of ourselves and that others can be wrong about. On the first page of the article that lays out his theory of identity, Gee describes it thus:

When any human being acts and interacts in a given context, others recognize that person as acting and interacting as a certain “kind of person” or even as several different “kinds” at once… The “kind of person” one is recognized as “being,” at a given time and place, can change from moment to moment in the interaction, canchange from context to context, and, of course, can be ambiguous or unstable.

Gee 99

Already, we see that under Gee’s formulation, identities will change depending on the points of view of those around us, as different people naturally have different relevant “types” available to categorize each other with. Therefore, identity in Gee’s formulation is clearly dynamic and culture-dependent.

With this in mind, consider Gee’s definition of N (nature)-identity:

I label the first perspective the nature perspective (or N-Identities). Let me first use an example from my own life. Part of my identity, one way of looking at “who I am,” is that I am an identical twin. Being an identical twin is a state that I am in, not anything that I have done or accomplished. The source of this state – the “power” that determines it or to which I am “subject” – is a force (in this case, genes) over which I had no control.

Gee 101

Given what he has said earlier in the article, he can only mean “nature” as the “source of power” in the minds of others, not necessarily in reality. While it is hard to imagine a category like “twin” as anything other than objectively true or false, bear in mind that Gee is still talking about being a “type of person”, and to the extent that a twin is a “type”, that “type” includes images, stereotypes, and assumptions that do not flow directly from whatever objective facts about being a “twin” may exist. I usually use blood type in my explanation of the disconnect between what one “is” and what forms one’s N-identity. Blood type, of course, is the same wherever one goes, but only in some societies is it a “kind of person”.

色々」おしゃれまとめの人気アイデア|Pinterest|あ ん【2020 ...
Source: https://www.pinterest.jp/pin/687432330609002411/. A breakdown of personality traits associated with each blood type. It says, for example, that type A are “literalists” and type B “hate being tied down”.

Gee explains as much himself:

Of course, natural identities can only become identities because they are recognized, by myself or others, as meaningful in the sense that they constitute (at least, in part) the “kind of person” I am. Thanks to “nature,” I have a spleen, but this (at least, for now) does not constitute anything meaningful, for me or others, in terms of my being a certain kind of person.

Gee 102

It is easier to see the distinction from the “source of power” and the content of an identity in people’s minds for the other 3 categories. Of I (institution)-identity, Gee writes:

The second perspective on identity I label the institutional perspective (or I-Identities). To take another example from my own life, it is part of my identity, one way of looking at “who I am,” that I am a professor in a university. Being a professor at the University of Wisconsin-Madison is a position. It is not something that nature gave me or anything I could accomplish by myself. The source of my position as a professor- the “power” that determines it or to which I am “subject” – is a set of authorities (in this case, the Board of Trustees, the administration of the university,and the senior faculty in my department). In turn, the source of this power is not nature, but an institution (namely, the University of Wisconsin).

Gee 102

Of D (discourse)-identity:

The third perspective on identity I call the discursive perspective (or D-Identities). Let me here take as an example a close friend and colleague of mine. It is part of the identity of this person that she is “charismatic”-this is one way of looking at “who she is.” Being charismatic, in the sense I intend here, is an individual trait, a matter of one’s individuality. It is not something that one just “is” (“born with”; note that one cannot be charismatic all alone by oneself on an island), and it is not something that some institution creates and upholds. However, to say that being charismatic is an individual trait is decidedly not to say that it is something one can achieve all by oneself. The source of this trait – the “power” that determines it or to which my friend is “subject” – is the discourse or dialogue of other people. It is only because other people treat, talk about, and interact with my friend as a charismatic person that she is one.

Gee 103

And of A (affinity)-identity:

The fourth perspective on identity I call the affinity perspective(or A-Identities). Here I will take the example of someone who is a Star Trekfan in the sense and way the people portrayed in the movie Trekkies are. This is one way of looking at “who this person is.” Being a Star Trek fan, in the sense I intend here, is composed of sets of distinctive experiences (e.g., attending shows, meeting actors from Star Trek at such shows, chatting on the Internet, collecting memorabilia, trading such memorabilia, dressing like a character in Star Trek).

Gee 105

Gee points out that some identities are assigned without the permission or acquiescence of the individual. A-identities seem to be by definition voluntary, but as for the others:

Like I-Identities, D-Identities can be placed on a continuum in terms of how active or passive one is in “recruiting” them, that is, in terms of how much such identities can be viewed as merely ascribed to a person versus an active achievement or accomplishment of that person.

Gee 104

That is, one can try to be shy or simply be regarded that way. One apply for and be hired for a job in a prison or be sent there by the state. On the other hand, N-identities are by definition out of the control of the individual, and people can feel a great transgression has occurred when one tries to intentionally alter an N-identity.

Identity Creep

My students have been using Gee’s theory for academic writing since at least 2017, usually for a typical ESL set of papers: one in which you apply a theoretical lens to one’s own experience, and one in which you apply it to a book (a text-on-text essay). The first text-on-text essay with NIDA identity as a lens that I assigned asked them to compare and contrast two identities of a single character in Farewell to Manzanar. Essays of this type (with different books) have become staples of my classes.

To take a famous character as an example, one might break down the N-identities of a character like Tom Robinson, the Black man wrongly accused of rape in To Kill a Mockingbird this way:

Based on a student essay excerpted below. “Criminal” here is meant as a matter of disposition rather than legal status (in which case it would be an I-identity).

Note that, as Gee’s identities need to be recognized, and therefore need a person to recognize them, these identities are from the perspective of the white townspeople who eventually kill Tom. Taking the perspective of Scout, Atticus, and some other characters in the story would completely change the contents of the chart.

One consistent observations in my students’ essays is that N-identity frequently does the work of other identities, and that this phenomenon targets members of certain groups. In Tom’s case, the “criminal” and “dishonest” identities that he carries don’t actually come from the “discourse or dialogue of other people” (Gee 103), or at most are affirmed by rather than emerge from discourse. In truth, he is assumed to have those characteristics because of his N-identity, which fills in the blanks in his other identities through the power of negative stereotyping.

Through slightly indirect means, his N-identity also affects his I-identity, by leading to both his arrest in the first place and later his conviction. In this case, strictly speaking, the N-identity isn’t directly supplying characteristics that might otherwise be established by how “other people treat, talk about, and interact” (Gee 103) with him, but making them much more likely or inevitable. It’s not true that white townspeople looked at him and thought “That man is a convicted rapist” before the incident that resulted in his arrest. However, it is possible that the community will also begin to retroactively attribute his imprisonment or conviction of a specific crime to facts of his birth.

That leaves his A-identity the only category not usurped in this way by “a force (in this case, genes) over which [Tom] had no control” (Gee 101), although this is probably due to a lack of detail from the novel than any limit on the power of stereotyping. I probably don’t need to explain to you that N-identities can both supply assumed affinities and affiliations and indirectly encourage them as much as for I-identities.

I’ll let my former student clarify (excerpted with their permission):

Tom Robinson’s N-Identity as an African American in the U.S. negatively influences his D-Identity because of his passivity in a scene in which he is falsely arrested. First of all, the story of TKAM takes place during the 1930s in Maycomb, Alabama, which is the so-called “Deep South.” This means that Tom lives in one of the most racially polarized societies, where African Americans are marginalized and racism is espoused by most white people after the Civil War. Under such circumstances, Tom’s N-Identity is the most conspicuous trait to others, and there are few differences between his N-Identity and D-Identity. Within this context, Tom is falsely accused of raping a white woman. Despite the fact that Tom is innocent, most of the white people in Maycomb consider Tom to be a liar and a violent criminal merely because he is an African American. At this point, the neighbors’ recognition of Tom can be classified as D-Identity because Gee defines D-Identity as being merely ascribed to a person through others’ recognitions (104). That is to say, in Tom’s case, his N-Identity as an African American directly leads to his D-Identity as a violent criminal. One problem is that Tom himself reinforces this unhealthy connection between N- and D-Identity by running away from the jail when he was arrested. In explaining an unintended consequence of his action, the narrator of TKAM describes that Tom would “expect to live long, so he took the first opportunity to run — a sure sign of guilt” (Lee 261). This indicates that running does not save Tom at all, but rather it merely emphasizes his passivity and underlines the neighbors’ derogatory recognition that Tom is a violent criminal because he is an African American. Tom does not reflect on a related effect between his negative N-Identity and his action, but just acts out of fear. As a result, Tom’s negative N-Identity as an African American maintains and/or reinforces his neighbors’ stereotype of him – D-Identity.  

Student paper, unnamed

Those of us who have lived abroad, or who have been a member of a stereotyped minority group, are probably well-used to the phenomenon of our ethnic group (whether the one we feel we actually belong to or not), our gender (ditto), or some other N-identity supplying more of our characteristics in the eyes of others than we are comfortable with. One could easily make up a graph similar to the above with the I-identity “English teacher” and the D-identity “gesticulates when speaking” supplied by the N-identity “foreigner” in the cultural contexts of Japan or China, or “engineer”, “good at STEM”, and “into League of Legends” for an exchange student from Asia in an American university.

This seems to be a phenomenon that afflicts historically marginalized or disempowered groups, precisely and tautologically because historically marginalized groups are likely to have N-identities that are salient and meaningful in the cultures where they are marginalized. White males, in the United States at least, are relatively unburdened with the classification of N-identity – “raceless” and “genderless” in (what I glean is) the modern understanding of how conceptual whiteness works. Women, especially white women, are less affected by N-identity creep now than previously, but it is easy to imagine contexts in which the N-identity of “woman” was capable of providing characteristics that nowadays would are more likely to be derived from discourse (such as “natural caretaker”) or institutions (“domestic worker”). A benefit of looking at this phenomenon through Gee’s lens is that it makes clear that these identities are not inherent to the people with them; they are recognized, and the sources of their power attributed, by other members of society. As Racecraft puts it, the phenomenon of using inherent characteristics of the marginalized as a shorthand for the process of their marginalization is “the great evasion of American historical literature, as of American history itself: the substitution of ‘race’ for ‘racism.’ That substitution, as I have written elsewhere, ‘transforms the act of a subject into an attribute of the object'” (Fields 48). Gee’s lens of identity makes clear that to the extent that stereotyped characteristics are attributed to membership in racialized or otherwise marginalized groups, it is because other people actively attribute them, not because those characteristics are inherent in those groups. Gee’s lens helps to turn agentless passive voice states into active voice processes.

Gee’s article later points out an opposing process to what I’ve called identity creep, what might be term the “discursivization” of identity, by which identities previously attributed to nature or relationships to durable institutions are instead seen as achievements which one strives to have recognized by others. Here, Gee’s theory dovetails neatly with theories of the performativity of gender and other social categories, the understanding of which among some intellectuals has moved from the public appearance of a biological reality to a phenomenon whose public performance is the only reality (e.g. Butler). This is another implication of Gee’s framework that is frequently noticed by my students – that all identities can be D-identities if people refuse to attribute them to nature or institutions, removing their assumed “natural” foundations. Just as identity creep seems to be a phenomenon that affects marginalized groups more, it may be true that identity discursivization is more possible the less marginalized one is. It may be easier for a celebrity like Caitlyn Jenner to have her gender identity recognized as an achievement than someone without the social capital of a former Olympian, who may continue to have their “biological” gender insisted upon as the only relevant criteria for recognizing an identity. Although Rachel Dolezal, a “biologically white” woman who has claimed a discursively achieved Black racial N-identity, has not been nearly as successful as Caitlyn Jenner in having that identity recognized, it has been pointed out that her attempts have been more successful than someone from a disempowered racial group claiming a white identity might have been.

Conclusion

This has been a long and pretentious blog post.

Works Cited

Butler, Judith. Gender trouble: Feminism and the subversion of identity. Routledge, 2011.

Fields, Barbara J. “Whiteness, racism, and identity.” International Labor and Working-Class History 60 (2001): 48-56.

Fields, Karen E., and Barbara Jeanne Fields. Racecraft: The soul of inequality in American life. Verso Trade, 2014.

Gee, James Paul. “Chapter 3: Identity as an analytic lens for research in education.” Review of research in education 25.1 (2000): 99-125.

False Intermediates

When I was teaching English in Japan, I got to know many false beginners – learners with grammar knowledge but little practical skill. Now that I teach in the US and at the higher end of an academic ESL program, I see them less often, but when I do, the signs are unmistakable: one browser tab always open to Google Translate, long delays in pragmatically simple conversational exchanges, and papers that adhere to some standards of grammar while missing the larger point of the assignment. The term false beginner seems to come from the idea that these students may appear to be beginners, but they’re really not – they just haven’t learned to apply what they know. I don’t believe that this definition accurately describes the phenomenon that I and many other language teachers have observed. Here, I want to expand the range of the term false when applied to learners and question what exactly is false about false beginners.

First of all, what is the grammar knowledge that false beginners supposedly have but can’t apply? Terms like explicit grammar knowledge or declarative knowledge mask large differences between what mental representations our students have of English and those we may wish them to have. The first thing that a very old-school MA TESOL English teacher trained to present, practice and produce discrete grammar items would notice if suddenly asked to teach a grammar course in Japan or China is that the students’ explicit knowledge of English is almost entirely 1) encoded in their L1, 2) aimed at direct translation into their L1, and 3) meant to be applied in a manner that displays depth and breadth of intellect rather than automaticity. It therefore only partly, even coincidentally, overlaps the grammar knowledge that the teacher may have, and is certainly not taught in order to make it less laborious. False beginners don’t just have unapplied knowledge, but often knowledge that the teacher wouldn’t recognize as English in the first place.

Real-world applications of English skill, therefore, are not simply the next step that students haven’t gotten to yet. Speaking in real time, writing papers, or enjoying literature have not been the goals of most false beginners‘ English educations, and the knowledge of English that they have is not just unpracticed for these goals but often unpracticable. What is required is not just activation of dormant knowledge, but new knowledge, taught in different ways with a different purpose.

Paradoxically, what is false about false beginners is not the fact that they are beginners, but that people assume that they are not beginners. With respect to either explicit knowledge or implicit knowledge, false beginners are simply beginners that people treat as if they weren’t because of their success in a related field – as if a helicopter were a kind of false airplane. I’ve never met a false beginner that had any advantage over a “true” beginner; if anything there seemed to be a substantial hole to dig out of. But the local definitions of English competence (the aforementioned regime of translation), encouraged by others and internalized by the student herself or himself, and some behavior that approximates competence, have convinced examiners and placement officials that the student really is acquiring English. The apparent acquisition, which is really just faster and more application of explicit rules of translation, can carry a student quite far in an orthodox EFL or ESL program. I have never seen a student who relied solely on translation all the way through an undergraduate or graduate program, but I have seen a great many get to the higher stages of academic ESL before the sheer amount of language forces them to reassess their approach or just drop out.

I’m not sure what makes the difference between a false beginner who gives up on applying grammar translation fairly early in a mainstream English course and one who sticks with it for years, up to the point when they could be called false intermediates (here, false meaning “not really intermediate”), but two characteristics I’ve noticed have been confidence in their own intelligence (not the intelligence itself – that is a can of worms I’d rather not open) and past success in their first educational culture. Confidence, which in many other cases would be a virtue, encourages learners to continue applying a mentally taxing and arduous routine of translating back and forth from their L1, embracing the strain as a welcome challenge. The teacher’s advice that it doesn’t need to be that hard is counterproductive, since the effort is part of the point. Also, learners have been rewarded for years for successful application of their translation skills by proud teachers, admiring classmates, and admission into exclusive programs or schools in their home country. The current teacher’s implications that they were all wrong threaten years of hard-won self-esteem. A combination of factors have made false intermediates strongly identify with translation as a means of approaching English in a way that makes them resistant to correction.

Conversely, one situation that seems to encourage false intermediates or false beginners to course-correct is one in which their less intellectual (by their standards) or less diligent (again, by their standards) countrymen begin leapfrogging them in their new educational culture. A hardworking but taciturn student from Japan can rationalize away the success of an enthusiastic Syrian as just an outcome of the compatibility of two foreign cultures. A dedicated translationist from Shanghai who sees a lackadaisical but gregarious classmate from Qingdao regularly and publicly showing mastery of difficult material on quizzes, class discussions, or presentations may be forced by cognitive dissonance to either reassess their strategy or their intelligence. Luckily, in my experience, the strategy is the one that is reevaluated.

The El Camino

The sunset definitely looked different in Hawaii, Yukino thought – all blurry around the edges, the sun just the brightest spot in a spectrum of colors that seemed to take up the whole sky – as she looked out the rear window of the car. “Car” was probably the best thing to call it. It was low to the ground and looked like a car from the front, but had a wide, flat bed like a pickup truck. It was not really a car or a truck, but a vehicle for which she had no precise word. If she had been back in Japan, she might have said it looked like a kei-tora, but she hadn’t seen one of those since moving to Honolulu 3 weeks ago, and anyway, her host mother was an ESL teacher, not a rice farmer. It definitely had a working engine, and that was enough. She really wanted to get away from her ESL school as quickly as possible and back to her host mother’s house, east of Honolulu.

Her host mother AND teacher. June filled both roles, although not to the same degree of propriety in Yukino’s estimation. She was a pretty normal host mother as far as Yukino could tell – taking her to Diamond Head, making her Loco Moco, but otherwise giving her space to send LINEs to her friends, which was welcome. These were what Yukino had been led to expect were what host mothers did. But he word “teacher” still didn’t seem appropriate. The way she conducted herself was within the boundaries of normal host mother behavior, but she was way out to left field as a teacher. Yukino wondered how June could even call herself a teacher.

At the start of her first lesson, Yukino had known that her host mother would also be her teacher (the school gave priority to employees of the school for homestay placements), and was consequently more relaxed than she might have been. She had introduced herself to the other students sitting near her – actually with her, since instead of rows of desks they had five peanut-shaped tables – and was setting out her textbook, pen case and electronic dictionary when she she saw on the display that class had already started six minutes ago. It was another five minutes before June walked in and nonchalantly joined one of the five tables in casual conversation, not taking her correct place at the front of the room. She proceded to visit briefly with every table, just as if she were another student, before excusing herself and walking out of the room again, as if the students were to teach themselves. Her classmates, not sure what to do but still excited to get to know each other, were still talking excitedly when one girl at the next table squealed that it was 11:35 and class was over. A few of the students from Africa (Yukino guessed) walked out of the room together, presumably heading to lunch, still bantering in English and occasional French. Yukino and her new friend Jimena (who was Colombian although her name sounded Japanese), who she’d met and gotten to know quite well already while they were both waiting in vain for June to return to the classroom, followed tentatively, not quite sure if the concept of “ending” applied to a class that seemed to observe no rules of time. In the lobby, Yukino saw that she and about ten other numbers had gotten a text from June – Jimena had gotten the same one – thanking them for being such enthusiastic learners (what had they learned?) and to prepare a short speech to introduce one person that they’d met at their table that day for homework. Jimena looked happy, and they hurriedly agreed to make each other their speech subjects, but Yukino wondered how she was supposed to do this without any help. Wasn’t the teacher supposed to give them the language first, then guide them through practice with it, and only last, maybe ask them to do it on their own? Had June actually taught them anything in class that day?

She didn’t voice these thoughts to June on the ride back in the strange car-truck vehicle, but just stared at the blurry-edged Hawaiian sunset and wondered how anyone could tell where the sun ended and the sky began.

A Taxonomy of Jargon

I’ve noticed a consistent difficulty that my ESL students have, which is comprehending words that are particular to a certain academic field, analytic lens, or article/book, especially as distinct from homonymous words in the dictionary. My classes often read Duhigg’s The Power of Habit as their main text, which features a unique definition of habit, among many other words. For example, Duhigg defines cue, routine, and reward thus:

This process within our brains is a three-step loop. First, there is a cue, a trigger that tells your brain to go into automatic mode and which habit to use. Then there is the routine, which can be physical or mental or emotional. Finally, there is a reward, which helps your brain figure out if this particular loop is worth remembering for the future... (19)

and later specifies further that a reward “can range from food or drugs that cause physical sensations, to emotional payoffs, such as the feelings of pride that accompany praise or self-congratulation” (Duhigg 25)

Clearly, a reward to Duhigg is something fairly intuitive and immediate, like the taste of a delicious food or relief from an itch, as he later illustrates with examples of rats and monkeys in behaviorist, stimulus-response-type experiments. Yet I consistently find in my students’ papers that they define reward much more similarly to their dictionaries, something like a biweekly paycheck or a college degree, often abstract and far off. This resetting of the definition of the academic jargon we’ve been learning back to its lay version happens with great regularity.

The issue seems to be that students will default to the dictionary definitions of those words when dictionary definitions are available, even if we’ve been talking about the newly learned definitions for weeks. That is, although we’ve been trying to hang a new concept on an old hook, students reaching for the old hook reliably come up with the old concept instead.

This got me thinking of how the jargon (Merriam-Webster: “the technical terminology or characteristic idiom of a special activity or group”) that students encounter throughout their academic careers varies, and how the differences between types of jargon can lead to easier or harder experiences of mastering them as words and as concepts. And though the word “jargon” can have a bit of a negative connotation, here I’m not at all interested in castigating academics for using the terminology particular to their field (even to the point of alienating non-experts) or even for coining new and potentially confusing terms, just identifying some characteristics that could make academic jargon more transparent or less transparent for English learners.

What follows is a preliminary attempt to categorize types of jargon according to overlap with other words and concepts.

Pure jargon (new words)

Perhaps the easiest jargon to identify is that which is clearly a new word, a term completely unique to its field, and though rare, one that probably occurs in the dictionary and exists in the students’ L1 with almost the same definition. Some examples of this type of jargon might be:

  • gluon, a type of subatomic particle
  • aphasia, a language disorder
  • semaphore, a way of organizing multiple processes in a computer
  • molality, something having to do with chemistry
  • palantir, a magical stone used for seeing

The most common issue with words like these in my experience is that students may translate them into the L1, recognize the translation, and then feel as if because they recognized (as opposed to understood) the translation, they therefore know the word. Obviously, someone who hasn’t studied chemistry in any language (like me) won’t really know what molality is.

But in general, these words’ properties as words aren’t what cause confusion, and what difficulties students have in grasping them are likely to be difficulties in grasping the concepts themselves.

Compound jargon

A step up in opacity is novel compound words, words whose components are known but when used in combination refer to a new concept. Some examples might be:

  • the Honeymoon Stage, one of Kalervo Oberg’s 4 stages of culture shock
  • the New Deal, a group of government programs during the Great Depression
  • the Great Depression, since I brought it up
  • nature-identity, one of Gee’s 4 identities (see references)
  • call-out (or cancel) culture, a straw man of conservatives on the Internet
  • blue book, either the publication containing a used car’s estimated value or the value itself

The superficial familiarity of everyday words like “great” and “depression” can yield a false sense of familiarity with the referent of the term “Great Depression”. In my experience though, most problems with understanding these terms come from incorrect parsing of their grammar: many students seem to read “Great Depression”, ignoring its capital letters and interpreting it simply as an adjective followed by a noun, as any depression which is large or severe.

Interpreting compound nouns, or adjective-noun pairs meant as proper nouns, can dovetail with understanding the role of lexical chunks. I have no evidence of this, but ability to comprehend compound jargon may correlate with ability to parse language as chunks rather than strictly as words and grammar.

Homonymous jargon

This class of jargon, sharing spelling and pronunciation with a lay term, is what I was talking about in the introduction, and to me, the type of jargon most likely to cause confusion. I have broken down this group into a few sub-categories:

Homonymous and conceptually similar

The most difficult jargon to distinguish from its vernacular equivalent is jargon which shares a form with a non-jargon word and refers to almost the same thing, but is defined more specifically or to fit within a particular framework. Some examples might be:

  • Cue-Routine-Reward, the three parts of the habit loop as defined by Duhigg
  • Mindset, either growth or fixed as defined by Dweck
  • Grit, perseverence in pursuit of a goal as defined by Duckworth
  • Health, an integer subject to increase with sleep or decrease with physical damage as defined by the Final Fantasy series

Again, the errors seem to stem most commonly from substituting in the lay version of a word’s definition when the technical one was called for.

Homonymous but conceptually different

Some homonymous jargon extends the meaning of a lay term to the point that the connection may not be clear to outsiders. Consider terms like “sweeten” in production, which means adding effects like a laugh track to make a final product more palatable, much like sugar does to tea.

Mitch Hedberg quote: We're gonna have to sweeten some of these ...

Other jargon which is not particularly close in meaning to its lay equivalent might be:

  • Whale, a high-stakes gambler
  • Remainder, to dispose of unsold books (also tricky for morphological reasons; the lay term “remainder” is a noun while the jargon is a verb)
  • Sleeve, the body into which a digitally stored consciousness is inserted (see also “Shell“)

I have never encountered an instance of a student accidentally reverting to the lay definition of a term like this in writing, perhaps because the definitions are so different as to preclude confusion. No one is going to write about a whale visiting a casino and suggest that he may have been disappointed to find the buffet out of krill.

Homonymous and “technically correct”

Within the type of jargon that is a homonym for its lay counterpart are many words whose definitions are distinct but which are taken as the “true” definitions of those words. That is, the technical definition is thought to be what people “really mean” when they use the word in other, non-technical contexts. Some examples might be:

  • Depression (I have a hypothesis that part of what makes psychology so difficult is that so much of its jargon are homonyms of everyday words like “self” and “positive”)
  • DNA, a stand-in for “heritage” in popular discourse but not in biology
  • Myth, a story with particular cultural power, interpreted in popular discourse as “a falsehood”
  • Million, liable to be corrected even when clearly meant as a synonym for “a lot” and not exactly 1,000,000 of something

To illustrate the difference between this type of jargon and the other homonymous jargon above, consider that someone who uses “DNA” in a sentence like “I love BBQ. It’s in my DNA” may be “corrected” and forced to rephrase, while someone who uses “whale” to refer to an aquatic mammal will never be reproached for sloppy, non-technical language use, nor will someone who uses “grit” to refer to general hardworkingness be shamed for not using Duckworth’s specific definition.

What to do

Some consciousness-raising work on just how common academic jargon is in university classes and the flexibility of words’ meanings is probably a good idea.

Part of this really should be a thorough introduction not just to the idea that dictionaries (bilingual or monolongual) or translation are not reliable ways to understand course content, but many illustrations of why, including showing a list of the possible translations of “grit” (for example) and invitating students to compare any of them to the specific definition that the course uses.

Perhaps jargon can be interpreted not as a stumbling block to success but as an opportunity to raise consciousness as to the relationships of words to the concepts that they refer to.

Works Cited

Gee, James Paul. “Chapter 3: Identity as an analytic lens for research in education.” Review of research in education 25.1 (2000): 99-125.

Duhigg, Charles. The Power of Habit: Why we do what we do and how to change. Random House, 2013.

Discussion Circles

Apologies to whoever I stole this idea from – I don’t remember who I should be crediting with it. It has, however, become a staple of my classes.

Previously, class discussions that I’ve worked into lessons have had problems. If the whole class tried to have a discussion together, a few very vocal students dominated the arena while others either tried in vain to compete or happily ceded the floor and retreated into themselves. If discussion groups were smaller, it was harder for non-participants to avoid notice, but discussions still depended on the willingness of a few people to keep a conversation going to prevent them from dissolving into a group of people sitting together, each checking his or her phone. Even groups that stayed on task would default to talkative students talking more and quieter students nodding along.

Discussion circles are a way of facilitating equally participatory conversation among students who naturally vary in their willingness to speak as themselves and voice opinions on either academic or familiar topics. They do this by:

  • Removing some of the burden on the students of representing themselves, because they are playing assigned roles rather than simply voicing their own thoughts,
  • Supplying pragmatically appropriate language, and
  • Encouraging participants, in various ways, to listen carefully to and respect each others’ contributions.

I use 3 versions of Discussion Circles sheets, each of which has 4 roles that participants need to play:

  • Discussion Leader
    • Chooses questions to ask and asks them
    • Begins and ends the meeting
  • Harmonizer
    • Thanks other members for participation
    • Asks for clarification
    • Rephrases others’ opinions
    • Encourages other members to participate
  • Reporter
    • Takes notes on the members’ contributions
    • Asks members to repeat or rephrase
  • Devil’s Advocate
    • Disagrees with other members’ contributions (constructively!)

These tasks are in addition to actually answering the questions that the Discussion Leader asks.

Each of these roles has a worksheet to fill out with sections for before, during, and after the discussion. These are turned in to the teacher afterward. The teacher, incidentally, is not involved in the discussions except to provide a list of questions and assign roles at the beginning.

The version of the worksheet that I use for at least the first 3 times that I do this activity is about 2 pages long per member. The “Before” and “After” sections are fairly involved and take about 10 minutes to do each. (The discussion itself can take anywhere between 20 minutes to an hour.)

You can get a copy of it here: Discussion circles online (called “online” because it is in a format that is easily distributable on Google Classroom. You can also print it.)

After they are used to the expectations of each role, I use a shortened version of the sheet. This one has a shorter “Before” section and no “After” section.

Find a copy here: Discussion circles lite online

Towards the end of the semester, I use a Turbo version of the sheet in which the participants switch roles with every question.

Get it here: Discussion circles turbo

In my Center for Excellence in Teaching and Learning group that meets on Fridays (basically a community of practice for new professors), I tried a revised Turbo version that had the job Quoter replacing Reporter.

Get it here: Discussion circles turbo 2

I give two grades for this assignment every time it is used: One grade for participation in the meeting and one for completing the worksheet. Now that we’re all online, the participation grade comes from a predetermined member recording their Zoom meeting and sharing the video with me.

Obviously, for the last few weeks of our spring 2020 semester, I’ve been distributing these online and having students share one sheet for the whole group rather than printing and handing out the sheets for an in-class discussion. I find that the distribution of responsibility in Discussion Circles, where everyone has to participate in order to complete their own sheet, suits the slightly impersonal nature of online synchronous discussions fine. Students often remark that they take more easily to some roles than others, but I try to make sure everyone plays every role at least once, so that even if they don’t “naturally” like to disagree with others, they will all be able to do so respectfully when it becomes important.

I find that Discussion Circles are a helpful scaffold for a lot of skills practice that we hope to see in class discussions, to the point that I rarely have a class discussion without them anymore. I hope you get some value from them too.

Thresholds in missed assignments predicting final grades

First, a note on a quick research project that yielded nothing interesting: I checked whether Canvas page views immediately before going remote, immediately after going remote, and the change in page views during that period were correlated with final grades, and they basically weren’t. I was wondering whether students who tended to check Canvas a lot (during the remote instruction period and before it) tended to do better in the class overall, and I didn’t find any evidence of that.

Also, and this will be mentioned again later, in checking the average scores for assignments over the past semester, I noticed that assignments that had to be done in a group were more likely to be completed than those that weren’t. This is interesting to me because setting up a Zoom meeting and talking to classmates, sometimes in other countries, would seem to be harder, not easier, than completing a worksheet by oneself. However, just taking two types of assignments from my Written Language class as examples, Reading Circles, which had to be done as a group via Zoom (or in person before we went remote in March), had a mean score of about 93% for the term, while Classwork, which included many assignments that were completed solo, had an average of 89%. In the Oral Language class, Discussion Circles (a sort of role-playing exercise with questions on an assigned topic) had an average scores of 99%, and Classwork 90%. It seems that Zoom meetings and the rare chance and synchronous interaction that they represent facilitate work, despite the pain of setting them up.

In other news, I have just completed my first academic year at the university IEP that I started at full-time last fall. As a celebration we got Thai takeout from one of the three good Thai restaurants in town (there are, mysteriously, no good Indian restaurants for 40 miles in any direction), and I immediately started blogging, vlogging, and tinkering with Google Sheets to fill the void left by work.

I’ve been slowly adding functionality to the Google Sheets that I use to do my end-of-course number crunching, mostly by figuring out new ways to use the FILTER function along with TTEST to see if there are statistically significant differences in my students’ final grades when they are separated into two populations according to some parameter. I put together a master Sheet for the year that included all of my classes between last August and now.

One possible factor that I had noticed anecdotally throughout the year was that students seemed more likely to fail or do poorly for assignments not turned in at all than for assignments done poorly. There was no shortage of work that was half-finished or ignored instructions, but the really low grades for the course were usually for students with work that was not even turned in.

So I set up a t-test on my Google Sheet to separate my students into two populations by the % of assignments that received a grade of 0 and look for a statistically significant difference in their final grades. Naturally, one expects students who have more 0s to do worse, but I still wondered where the dividing lines were – did getting 0s on more than 5% of assignments produce statistically significantly different populations? Did 10% do the trick? Is there a more graceful way of expressing this idea than “statistically significantly different”?

The relevant cells in my Google Sheet look like this:

As you can maybe figure out from the above, missing 10% of assignments (regardless of the points that those assignments were worth) produced a statistically significant difference in final grades: those who missed 10% or more of assignments had a final course grade of 66.9% (or D) on average while those who missed less than 10% had an average course grade of 90.8% (or A-).

On the other hand, getting full scores (which in my class means you followed all the directions and didn’t commit any obvious mistakes like failing to capitalize words at the starts of sentences) on more than 50% of assignments also produced a statistically significant difference in final grades: those who got full scores on 50% or more of assignments had a final course grade of 93.2% (or A) on average while those who got full scores on less than 50% had an average course grade of 78.4% (or C+). This isn’t the difference between passing and failing, but the ratio of full scores does produce two populations, one of which fails on average and one of which passes – see below.

Other significant dividing lines were:

  • Missing 3% of assignments
    • If you missed more than 3%, your average grade was 83.3% (B)
    • If you missed 3% or less, your average grade was 92.1% (A-)
  • Missing 5% of assignments
    • If you missed more than 5%, your average grade was 78.6% (C+)
    • If you missed 5% or less, your average grade was 91.7% (A-)
  • Getting full scores on 35% of assignments
    • If you got a full score on more than 35%, your average grade was 90.0% (A-)
    • If you got a full score on 35% or less, your average grade was 68.0% (D+)
  • Getting full scores on 70% of assignments
    • If you got a full score on more than 70%, your average grade was 96.6% (A)
    • If you got a full score on 70% or less, your average grade was 85.0% (B)

As you can see, I am not a prescriptivist on the use of the word “less”.

As you can also see, there are some red lines that pertain to the number of assignments that students can miss before they fall into a statistical danger zone: 10% of assignments missed, or only 35% of assignments with full scores. A student who fails to meet these thresholds is statistically likely to fail.

Statistics like these don’t carry obvious prescriptions about what to do next, but I worry a bit that the number of missed assignments will go up as classes are moved permanently online and assignments lose the additional bit of salience that comes from being on a physical piece of paper that is handed to you by a physical person. I also, for mostly bureaucratic reasons, worry that my grades seem to reflect less “achieving learning outcomes” and more “remembering to check Canvas” – although I’m sure this discrepancy is nearly universal in college classes.

I am considering giving fewer assignments per week that are more involved – fewer “read this article and complete this worksheet” and more “read this article, make a zoom discussion, and share the video and a reflection afterward”. We will see if that produces grades that reflect the quality of work rather than the mere existence of it.

Academic ESL and interlanguage: Partially totally effective or totally partially effective (or effective for other purposes)?

Three hypotheses for the observed effectiveness of academic ESL for preparing students for academic work in English:

  1. Academic ESL is perfectly effective at developing interlanguage, but academic ESL classes finish before the end of interlanguage development because students cease being ESL students and matricutate into regular degree programs. Students would still benefit from academic ESL after this point, but rarely have time due to their undergraduate or graduate class schedules. Some stunting occurs in students’ interlanguage because of the premature end of their ESL courses.
  2. Academic ESL is partially effective at developing interlanguage, and academic ESL classes finish at the end of their period of effectiveness. Students would not benefit from more academic ESL after this point because interlanguage development cannot occur through further academic ESL classes. Students are more likely to have student interlanguage development because of excessive time spent in ESL than a premature start to their degree programs.
  3. Academic ESL is partially effective at developing interlanguage but mainly effective at introducing compensatory strategies for students to use to make up for their lower language skills. Some of these strategies are specific to language learners and others are of use to any college student, but former ESL students in degree programs succeed by using them more than other students. Interlanguage development is less predictive of academic success than application of compensatory strategies.

Earlier this semester, we requested some data from our campus researcher, and he just got back to us. I won’t say what exactly he told us, but it pertained to average GPAs among different populations of undegrads, and it was good news for the apparent effectiveness of our IEP.

That said, we don’t know why our IEP appears to be effective. It is possible that we are getting better at our jobs. It is also possible that we are just recruiting better students. It’s possible that our students are far better than average, but we’re doing a worse-than-average job preparing them for college, resulting in performance that converges on the mean. Assuming that the work we do in class is at least part of the reason, it might help us to better focus our efforts in order to improve even more if we knew what part of what we do in class helps our students the most.

(For most of my career, I was used to the idea that interlanguage development started when students joined my class and stopped when they quit. In EFL, you can’t count much on outside factors to keep the interlanguage development ball rolling – students aren’t part of formal or informal organizations that facilitate regular English use and their identities accommodate English as a hobby at most. I tried as the owner of an eikaiwa to get students to start pastimes that included English, only to realize that as an eikaiwa teacher, I was the pastime. In short, I was used to thinking of English class as a self-contained unit; anything I wanted my students to do with English we had to do together.

I realized partway through my first year teaching community college ESL in California that we were by design only giving our students a partial education. We wanted to send them off into English 100 with maybe a bit of a head start and without a lot of baggage, but we expected English 100 to continue the work of interlanguage development. I’m sure some of us thought that ESL would still benefit our students, but they had to get on with their credit-bearing classes eventually, and some of us probably thought that ESL was inherently limited in what it could accomplish. There are also those who think that the one and only way that a student will come to understand adjective clauses is if the teacher explains adjective clauses and have never heard of interlanguage.)

Anyway, this would make a good long-term study project: find a decent sample of former academic ESL students in their undergrad years, give them the TOEFL or IELTS (which they wouldn’t have taken in a few semesters at least), survey them on their “compensatory strategies” (defining those would be a lot of work), and measure those against their undergraduate GPAs.

By the way, I’ve started recording some old blog posts as vlogs, seeing how different people tend to read ELT blogs and watch ELT-related content on YouTube. Feel free to stop by and leave a comment about how I don’t look like you expected.

Dr. Brute Facts doesn’t care about your feelings

Of all of the world’s doctors, and particularly at St. Jude’s Hospital, Dr. Judd Shapiro is a physician with a rare gift. While most doctors consider the physical body a vessel for a living, thinking person first and foremost, and the apperception and treating of the physical body a worthy enterprise because of the comfort that it might bring such a person, Shapiro considers the person to be a mere collection of physical phenomena, of value only as the sum total of the stuff of which it is made. To be even more precise, “it”, the physical body, barely exists to him; it demands no more recognition of oneness or continuity than does the air in a balloon or the water that makes up a particular section of river. This is not just a matter of point of view, but more of the acuity of his senses: he sees the interactions of particles and waves in front of him much like you or I see a fly landing on a window, and thinks primarily on that scale, the scale that is most intuitive and meaningful to him. The scope of his thought can be widened to include constructs we might call “life”, including human life, and on some occasions he be persuaded to adopt our conventions of grouping matter into “cells”, “organs”, and “people”. In this way he has a grasp, in both the general and particular senses, of the true inner workings of the human body, and any body that happens to be in his examination room. He knows both the sequences of DNA (that is, can recite the base pairs) that commonly predispose one to abnormal hemoglobin production as well as the precise location and corpuscular hemoglobin concentration of any given red blood cell in the bloodshot, overworked eye of any of the nurses. The difficulty of working with him lies not in his intellect but where he is inclined to focus it, in convincing him to think of the physical phenomena that he is attuned to as part of a “body” or a “patient” at all. To him, arrangements of matter in the coordinated pattern we call a “human” are but a convenience, a mental shorthand, for those without direct access to the atomic motion that underlies it all. When his opinion is solicited, he has the habit of emerging from a trance-like state to declare, “facts, not feelings” – which, as far as we can tell, is an enjoinder to let go of our parochial attachment to bodies and minds of the patients under our care and focus on simply what is objectively there. To him, a “body” is a random selection of the possible arrangements of matter, only intrinsically appealing to humans because we appreciate things of roughly our own size, and in particular things whose cells contain DNA recombinable with our own. He seems to see no point in putting his answers to us, when we can get them, in body-scale terms, instead phrasing them in the the brute factual language of nature. They often come in descriptions of the states of electrons somewhere nearby, which would be useless to us even if it were clear that these electrons were in the patient’s body and relevant to his complaint. If we manage to elicit a comment on a particular condition, we find that just as often as not he has taken the side of the disease over the patient. At one point, a fellow doctor contributed weeks of study to discern the meaning of one off-hand comment Dr. Shapiro had made about a T being where a C should be (we were lucky that in this case he favored us with an explanation in terms of molecules rather than quanta), thinking that it might hold a clue as to the particular mutation in liver cells that led to a patient’s hepatoblastoma, only to find that Dr. Shapiro’s remark was about the liver’s healthy cells – Dr. Shapiro seemed to see no reason that the patient’s whole liver should not be cancer. Apparently, cancer displays all of the hallmarks of what we call “living”, with the added bonus of not disturbing his trances with irrelevant questions.

I wonder if it would not be a terrible burden on his gift of perception to favor the intuitions of others as to the relative value of different arrangements of matter, seeing that he accepts the incomparably more arbitrary construct that is “employment” as a “doctor” and the remuneration it brings.